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CONSUMER NEWS
LINKLINE DECISION PUTS THE SQUEEZE
ON THE PRICE SQUEEZE THEORY OF
LIABILITY
Dawn Goulet*

n February 25, 2009, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in
Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. linkLINE Communications, Inc.
("linkLINE"), resolving a circuit split over the viability of price squeeze
claims under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.1 As predicted, the Court
used the LinkLINE case as an opportunity to reinforce the message in
Trinko further limiting the reach of Section 2 by, if not abolishing
outright, then certainly squeezing the life out of the price squeeze
theory of liability.2
I. THE FACTS
The plaintiffs in linkLINE are independent Internet Service
Providers ("ISPs") who sold DSL internet access, using existing
telephone lines, to retail customers in California.' Because of the high
cost
of
building
the
required
infrastructure,
regional
telecommunications monopolies have developed, known as incumbent
local exchange carriers ("ILECs").4 These ILECs control the delivery of
telecommunications services within their regions, especially the
* J.D. Candidate, May 2oo9, Loyola University Chicago School of Law.
Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. linkLINE Commc'ns, Inc., No. 07-512, 2009 U.S. LEXIS

1635 (Feb. 25, 2009) [hereinafter linkLiNE]. Chief Justice Roberts was joined in his opinion by
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas and Alito, with Justices Breyer, Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg
joining in a concurring opinion.
2 Manfred Gabriel, Thoughts on LinkLine, ANTITRUST REV., at http://www.antitrust
review.com/archives/1471 (Nov. 19, 2oo8, 8:45 p.m. EST).
' LinkLine Commc'ns., Inc. v. California, Inc., f/k/a Pacific Bell Telephone Co., 503 F.3d
876,877 (9th Cir. 2007).
4 Id.
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telephone lines known as the "last mile" which connect individual
consumers to the network.' Independent ISPs that want to connect to
consumers must deal with their regional ILECs.6
For the linkLINE ISPs, the ILEC was SBC California, a
subsidiary of SBC Communications, now. AT&T. 7 SBC, through its
various subsidiaries and affiliates sold both wholesale DSL access to
the ISPs and retail DSL access to individual consumers, making the
company both a supplier to the ISPs at the wholesale level and their
competitor at the retail level.' On July 24, 2003, the ISPs filed suit
against SBC in the Northern District of California, alleging violation of
§ 2 of the. Sherman Act.' The complaint's primary allegation: that SBC
"created a price squeeze by charging ISPs a high wholesale price in
relation to the price at which [it] w[as] providing retail services."1 °
II. A CIRCUIT SPLIT IN THE SHADOW OF TRINKO
On July 6, 2004, SBC moved for a judgment on the pleadings."
The trial court, which interpreted the plaintiffs' complaint to allege a
refusal and deal and denial of access to an essential facility, as well as
price squeezing, dismissed the first two theories of liability, finding they
were barred by the Supreme Court's recent decision in Verizon
Commc'ns v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398
(2004).12 The court allowed the plaintiffs, however, to file an amended

13
complaint to allege specific facts supporting their price squeeze claim.
It ultimately denied SBC's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,
14
but granted its request to certify the order for interlocutory appeal.
On review, the Ninth Circuit considered the following question:
whether the Supreme Court's decision in [Trinko] bars a
plaintiff from claiming a violation of § 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act
by virtue of an alleged price squeeze perpetrated by a competitor who
also serves as the plaintiff's supplier at the wholesale level, but who has
no duty to deal with the plaintiff absent statutory compulsion."

' Id.
6 Id. at 878.
Id.
Ild.

LinkLine Commc'ns., Inc. v. California, Inc., f/k/a Pacific Bell Telephone Co., 503 F. 3 d
876,878.
10 Id. (citing linkLINE Communications, Inc. v. SBC California, Inc., No. CV 03-5265, 2004
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30761, at *7 (N.D. Cal. 2004)).
" Id.
l Id. at 879.
13 Id.
'4

Id. at 88o.

LinkLine Commc'ns., Inc. v. California, Inc., f/k/a Pacific Bell Telephone Co., 503 F. 3 d
876, 877.
"
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The Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial court's denial of SBC's
motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding that "Trinko did not
involve a price squeezing theory," because the theory "formed part of
the fabric of traditional antitrust law prior to Trinko," and holding that
the ISP's complaint stated a potentially valid claim under § 2.6 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split over the issue
presented in linkLINE, as the D.C. Circuit had previously held that
such claims were barred by Trinko in Covad Conimc'ns Co. v. Bell Atl.
Corp., 398 F.3d 666 (D.C. Cir. 2005)."
III. DID LINKLINE POSE A MOOT QUESTION?
The Court seems to have rushed to grant certiorari in this case,
an interlocutory appeal from a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for judgment on
the pleadings, where the facts had not been fully developed." As a
preliminary maiter, the Court admitted that the case had "assumed an
unusual posture," because the plaintiff ISPs took up the position of the
dissent in the Ninth Circuit decision, by Judge Gould. 9
Now
consenting that their price squeeze claims would be required to meet
the Brooke Group requirements for predatory pricing, the ISPs asked
the Court to vacate the decision below and grant them leave to amend
in accordance with Brooke Group.2" The Court concluded, however
that the parties were still seeking different relief, were therefore still
adverse, and seemed unconvinced that the ISPs had really abandoned
their price squeeze claim. 2 Stating that "prudential concerns favor our
answering the question presented," the Court went ahead to resolve the
circuit split that prompted it to grant certiorari.22
IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION

In its opinion, the Court, led by Chief Justice John Roberts,
held that the ISPs' claim was "nothing more than an amalgamation of a
meritless claim at the retail level and a meritless claim at the wholesale
level," for "[i]f there is no duty to deal at the wholesale level and no
predatory pricing at the retail level, then a firm is certainly not required
"6 Id. at 833.
17 linkLINE, supra note i,at *14.
's

Gabriel, supra note

'9

linkLINE, supra note i,at *15.

2.

20 Id. This is the relief that the concurring justices, led by Justice Breyer, would have granted

them. In Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222-24 (1993),
the Court established two requirements for predatory pricing: below-cost retail pricing and a
"dangerous probability" that the defendant would recoup its lost profits.
2! linkLINE, supra note i,at *15-16.
22 Id. at *17.
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to price both of these services in a manner that preserves its rivals'
profit margins. '22 The Court was concerned that "recognizing a price
squeeze claim where the defendant's prices remain above cost would
invite the prices harm the Court sought to avoid in Brooke Group:
Firms might raise retail prices or refrain from aggressive price
'24
competition to avoid potential antitrust liability.
The Court went on to explain that, pursuant to its repeated
emphasis on the importance of clear rules in antitrust law,
"[i]nstitutional concerns also counsel[ed] against recognition of such
claims. '2 Quoting Trinko, it reiterated that "[c]ourts are ill suited to act
as central planners, identifying the proper price, quantity, and other
terms of dealing," and that "[n]o court should impose a duty to deal that
it cannot explain or adequately and reasonably supervise. '26 Such
problems "should be deemed irremediable by antitrust law" when they
require the court "to assume the day-to-day controls characteristic of a

regulatory agency. "27
V. WHAT THE COURT DID NOT Do
What is more surprising about this decision than the fact that
the Court overruled the Ninth Circuit, further collapsing Section 2
liability, is what the Court did not do. Notably, it "sidestepped the
explicit invitation from the Solicitor General and AT&T to overrule the
price squeeze analysis" in the classic 1945 price squeeze case, Alcoa.25
Instead the Court simply explained that "[g]iven developments in
economic theory and antitrust jurisprudence since Alcoa, [it] f[ou]nd
[its] recent decisions in Trinko and Brooke Group more pertinent to the
question before [it]. '29 As one commentator has put it, with this decision
the Court has "respectfully placed [the Alcoa case] in the attic, and not

23 Id. at *25 (emphasis in original).
24 Id. at *6.
25 Id. at *26.
26 Id. (quoting Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, at 4o8) (internal quotations omitted).
27 Id. (quoting Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, at 4o8 ) (internal quotations omitted).

28 Monopolization: Where Defendant Has No Duty to Deal, Price Squeeze Claim Isn't Viable
Under §2, BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REGULATION REPORT (Feb. 27, 2oo9), available at 96

ATRR 177 [hereinafter Monopolization] (quoting Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr., of the Washington, D.C.,
office of Latham & Watkins LLP). As the Court noted in linkLINE:
in [United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416 (1945)], the
Government alleged that Alcoa was using its monopoly power in the upstream
aluminum ingot market to squeezed the profits of downstream aluminum sheet
fabricators. The [Alcoa] court concluded: 'That it was unlawful to set the price of
'sheet' so low and hold the price of ingot so high, seems to us unquestionable,
provided, as we have held, that on this record the price of ingot must be regarded as
higher than the 'fair price.' linkLine, No. 07-512, 2009 U.S. LEXIS 2635, at *25-26
n. 3. (internal citations ommitted).
29 linkLINE, supra note i, at 26 n. 3.
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put [it] out with the trash."3'
Additionally, near the very end of the opinion, the Court seems
to foreshadow even greater future obstacles for plaintiffs alleging §2
claims:
Even if the amended complaint is further amended to add a
Brooke Group claim, it may not survive a motion to dismiss. For if
AT&T can bankrupt the plaintiffs by refusing to deal altogether, the
plaintiffs must demonstrate why the law prevents AT&T from putting
them out of business by pricing them out of the market. Nevertheless,
such questions are for the District Court to decide in the first
instance ... We are a court of review, not of first review."
With this closing comment, the Roberts Court seems poised and
eager to further squash Section 2 liability in the future.
VI. CONCLUSION

Reactions to the Court's decision in linkLINE have included
several criticisms. Initially, by eliminating the price squeeze theory of
liability for entities regulated at the wholesale level, the Court leaves it
to the regulator, here the FCC, to lower the wholesale rate and prevent
the price squeeze, but does so in a time where faith in the ability of
federal regulation to protect consumers is at an all-time low."
The
decision also underscores the ever-widening gap between U.S. and
European Union antitrust approaches with respect to vertically
integrated monopolists.33

30 Monopolization,supra note 28.
3' linkLINE, supra note i, at *33 (internal quotation and citation omitted).
31 Id.
(citing statements by Professor Eleanor M. Fox, New York University School of Law,
former Department of Justice International Competition Policy Advisory Committee member).
33 Id. (citing statements by Donald I. Baker, of the Washington, D.C. firm Baker & Miller,
PLLC, former Chief of the Department of Justice's Antitrust Division in the Ford and Carter
administrations).
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SUPREME COURT FINDS FDA APPROVAL
OF PHARMACEUTICAL WARNING LABELS
DOES NOT PREEMPT STATE TORTCLAIMS
Dawn Goulet

n March 4, 2009, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Wyeth v.
Levine, the most recent in a trilogy of FDA preemption cases to
wend their way to the Supreme Court.3 4 The case involved a migraine
sufferer who contracted gangrene and lost part of her arm after
receiving an administration of Wyeth's nausea drug Phenergan via "IV
push," a disfavored method of administration that can cause the drug to
inadvertently be injected into an artery.35 Called "the mother of all
preemption cases," by the Wall Street Journal's Health Blog, 6 a finding
of preemption in Levine had the potential to eliminate many hundreds
of state tort and consumer protection actions by private plaintiffs and
state attorneys general. 7 Consumer protection advocates around the
country breathed a sigh of relief, and perhaps a little surprise, as the
Court announced that the longstanding coexistence of state and federal
law in the area of pharmaceutical warning labels would remain intact.
In the opinion, Justice Stevens identified two issues of fact
decided by the trial court and two legal principles that guided the
Court's decision." The trial court's proceedings initially "established
that Levine's injury would not have occurred if Phenergan's label had
included an adequate warning about the risks of the IV-push method of
administering the drug," and "further established that the critical defect
in Phenergan's label" was the lack of such a warning. 9 The Court was
also primarily guided by what Stevens referred to as the "two
cornerstones of [its] pre-emption jurisprudence":
34 Wyeth v. Levine, No. o6-I249, 2oo9 U.S. LEXIS 1774 (Mar. 4, 2009).
"

Id. at *6.

36 Jacob Goldstein, Wyeth v. Levine: The Mother of All Preemption Cases, WSJ HEALTH

BLOG, http://blogs/wsj.com/health/2oo8/o9/i wyeth-v-levine-the-mother-of-all-preemption-cases/.
3 See this author's previous discussion of this case in Consumer News: Supporters and
Opponents of Federal Preemption Take Sides, Anticipate High Court's Ruling on Third FDA
Preemption Case This Year, 21 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 96 (2oo8).
'sLevine, supra note 34, at *14. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by
Justices Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer. Breyer and Thomas filed separate concurring
opinions, and Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which he was joined by Justices Roberts
and Scalia.
39 Id.
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First, the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in
every pre-emption case.
Second, [i]n all pre-emption cases, and
particularly in those in which Congress has legislated.., in a field in
which the States have traditionally occupied.., we start with the
assumption that the historic police powers of the States [a]re not to be
superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress."
The Court first rejected Wyeth's argument that state law claims
should be preempted because they made it impossible to comply with
federal labeling duties.41
It pointed out that "[i]mpossibility preemption is a demanding defense,"4 2 and that, although a manufacturer
may only change a drug label after the FDA approves a supplemental
application, the Agency's "changes being effected" ("CBE") regulation
allows the manufacturer to "add or strengthen a contraindication,
warning, precaution, or adverse reaction," or to "add or strengthen an
instruction about dosage and administration that is intended to increase
4 3
the safe use of the drug product," without waiting for FDA approval.
The Court disagreed with Wyeth's claim that the CBE
regulation only applies where the manufacturer has acquired
completely new data concerning the drug, finding instead that "newly
acquired information... is not limited to new data, but also
encompasses new analyses of previously submitted data," thus
acknowledging that "risk information accumulates over time and the []
the same data may take on a different meaning in light of subsequent
developments. 4 4 The Court found "Wyeth's cramped reading of the
CBE regulation" to be "premised on a more fundamental
misunderstanding.., that the FDA, rather than the manufacturer,
bears primary responsibility for drug labeling," including ensuring that
the labeling remains adequate for as long as the drug is marketed, a
presumption the Court firmly rejected.45
Wyeth's next argument, "that requiring it to comply with a
state-law duty to provide a stronger warning..,
would obstruct the
purposes and objectives of the federal drug labeling regulation," was
also rejected. 6 Wyeth argued that the FDCA establishes both a ceiling
and a floor for drug regulation, but the Court disagreed, finding that
"all evidence of Congress' purpose is to the contrary," based in part on
the fact that Congress has had 70 years during which to amend the
40 Id. at *i6-

7 (internal citations and quotations omitted).

4' Id. at *3.
42 Id.
" Levine, supra note 34, at *22.
44 Id. at *23 (internal quotation omitted).

" Id. at *26.
46 Id. at *45.
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FDCA, and has in fact added an express preemption provision for
medical devices, but has notably not done so for prescription drugs.
To support its "ceiling and floor" argument, Wyeth referenced a muchdebated preamble to a 2006 FDA regulation in which the FDA itself
announced its recent view under the Bush administration that the
FDCA was to have preemptive effect. 48
The Court found this
pronouncement was "entitled to no weight,"49 and was "inherently
suspect" in light of the way the Agency slipped it into the regulation
without providing interested parties notice or an opportunity to
comment on it,5" and based on the fact that it "plainly d[id] not reflect
the agency's own view at all times relevant to th[e] litigation."'"
In conclusion, the Court extolled the benefits of a dual system of
state and federal regulation, especially appropriate where, as here, the
FDA has limited resources to monitor the many drugs on the market
and where pharmaceutical manufacturers have far superior access to
information about the safety of their drugs.5 2 Because state tort suits
''serve a distinct compensatory function that may motivate injured
persons to come forward with information," state law claims provide
"an additional, and important, layer of consumer protection that
complements FDA regulation."53

4IId. at *20, *32-33.
48 Id. at *34-35.
41 Levine, supra note 34, at *45.
SO Id. at *38.
51

Id.

5 Id. at *39.

Id. at *39-4o.
I'
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PRESIDENT OBAMA SELECTS

NEW FTC CHAIRMAN
Dawn Goulet

n March 2, 2009, President Barack Obama designated
Commissioner Jon Leibowitz to succeed Republican William
Kovacic as Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"). 54 At
present, Leibowitz is the only Democrat on the Commission. In
addition to Kovacic, the FTC has two additional commissioners, J.
Thomas Rosch, a Republican, and Pamela Jones Harbour, an
independent. One seat is currently vacant."5
Leibowitz, who was the Democratic chief counsel and staff
director for the U.S. Senate Antitrust Subcommittee from 1997 to 2000,
became an FTC Commissioner in 2004.56 In addition to serving as
chief counsel to several other Senate subcommittees and individual
senators over the years, Leibowitz also served as Vice President for
Congressional Affairs for the Motion Picture Association of America
from 2000 to 2004. s7
One area of focus some anticipate the Chairman to push for in
the coming months is increased online privacy safeguards, especially in
light of the emerging use of so-called "behavioral advertising," in which
online advertisers track a consumer's online activities in order to
deliver targeted advertisements. 8 This is confirmed by Leibowitz'
recent concurring statement to the FTC's staff report "Self-Regulatory
Principles for Online Behavioral Advertising," in which the
Commissioner expressed concern that "online tracking and data
collection, coupled with inadequate notice to consumers about what
information is collected and how it is used, raise critical privacy
concerns. ""' The Commissioner chose to write separately "to ensure
that the Report's endorsement of self-regulation [wa]s viewed neither as
a regulatory retreat by the Agency nor an imprimatur for current

s' Press Release, John Leibowitz Named Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission (Mar.
3, 2oo9), http://www2.ftc.gov/opa/2009/o3/chairman.shtm [hereinafter FTC Press Release].
ss See FTC organizational chart at http://ftc.gov/ftc-org-chart.pdf.
56 FTC Press Release, supra note 54.
57 Id.
" Appointments: Obama Taps Leibowitz to Chair Commission, BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE
REGULATION REPORT (Mar. 6, 2009), availableat 96 ATRR 207 [hereinafter Appointments].
'9 CONCURRING STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER JON LEIBOWITZ, FTC STAFF REPORT:
SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES FOR ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING i (Feb. 2009),

http://www.ftC.gov/os/2009/o2/Po854oobehavadleibowitz.pdf.

Loyola Consumer Law Review

438

[Vol. 21:3

business practices."6
Another issue on which Leibowitz has made his position clear is
the use of patent litigation and settlements between brand name and
generic pharmaceutical manufacturers to keep less costly generics off
the market. Leibowitz wrote a piece for the Washington Post in
February, 2008 titled "This Pill Not to Be Taken with Competition:
How Collusion Is Keeping Generic Drugs Off the Shelves" and gave a
statement before the House Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and
Consumer Protection in May, 2007 in support of H.R. 1902, a proposed
bill to eliminate these pay-for-delay settlements.6 Most recently, in
February, 2009, the Commissioner authored a concurring statement in
a case against Watson Pharmaceuticals, where he clearly announced his
view that "[e]liminating these pay-for-delay settlements is one of the
most important objectives for antitrust enforcement in American
today," because "illegally delaying generic entry on even a single drug
6 2
can cost consumers billions of dollars.

With Leibowitz' outspoken views on such issues, it comes as no
surprise that consumer advocates have welcomed the President's
decision to appoint him to the position of Chairman. Chris Murray,
senior counsel for Consumers Union, said Leibowitz is "the right person
for this moment," when "the need for antitrust scrutiny and consumer
protection have never been greater." Others feel hopeful that the new
Chairman will "help transform what has been a largely anemic
regulatory watchdog during the Bush years."64 Leibowitz himself has
said he "look[s] forward to continuing [the FTC's] rich tradition of
vigorous antitrust enforcement and consumer protection."

60 Id.
6 See Jon Leibowitz, This Pill Not to Be Taken with Competition:How Collusion is Keeping
Generic Drugs Off the Shelves, THE WASHINGTON POST AI5 (Feb. 25,

2oo8); H.R. 19o2,

Protecting Consumer Access to Generic Drugs Act of 2oo7: Hearing before the House
Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade and Consumer Protection, Committee on Energy and
Commerce, i ioth Cong. (2007) (oral statement of FTC Commissioner Jon Leibowitz) available at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches1eibowitz/o7o5o2reversepayments.pdf. See also Paying Off Generics
to Prevent Competition with Brand Name Drugs: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, iioth Cong. (2007) (statement of Jon Leibowitz, Commissioner, Federal Trade
Commission), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=2472&wit-id=
5981.
62 CONCURRING

STATEMENT

OF

COMMISSIONER

JON

LEIBOWITZ,

FEDERAL

TRADE

COMMISSION V. WATSON PHARMACEUTICALS, ET AL. (Feb. 2, 2oo9) http://www.ftc.gov/speeches
leibowitz/o9o2o2 watsonpharm.pdf; see also http:lwww.ftc.govloslcaselisti8 101561o8 I2i6ovation

leibowitzstmt.pdf.
' Appointments, supra note 5.
Id. (quoting Jeff Chester, executive director of the Center for Digital Democracy, a
Washington-based advocacy group.)
6' FTC Press Release, supra note 54.

